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Abstract 
Contrary to the predictions of standard economic theory, capital market liberalization has been a mixed 
blessing for many countries. Liberalization of debt inflows exposes economies to the risk of crises 
stemming from sudden changes in investor sentiment. Equity market liberalizations, on the other hand, 
have promoted growth in almost every liberalizing country. Yet equity market liberalizations have not had 
as strong an effect as might be expected. To convince outsiders to invest, countries must put in place laws 
and supporting institutions to protect the rights of minority shareholders. Countries with such protections 
tend to have larger, more efficient, and more stable stock markets than those that do not. 
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 Over a decade ago, Robert Lucas asked the following question: Why doesn’t more capital flow 
from rich to poor countries? His point was simple. Poor countries have lower capital-to-labor ratios than 
rich ones. Under standard neoclassical assumptions, the rate of return to capital in poor countries should 
be higher than in the developed world, attracting capital until risk-adjusted rates of return are equalized. 
In other words, market pressures should lead to a positive net transfer of resources to less-developed 
countries, thus boosting their growth rates. Lucas encouraged us to think about the obstacles that prevent 
such flows from occurring. 
When Lucas asked his question, the prevailing wisdom was that capital flows to developing 
countries were a good idea. More than ten years later, intellectual opinion has shifted. A heated debate 
over capital account liberalization has followed in the wake of financial crises in Asia, Russia, and Latin 
America. Opponents of the process now argue that capital account liberalization invites speculative hot 
money flows, increases the likelihood of financial crises, and brings no discernible economic benefits. 
Some economists have gone so far as to assert that open capital markets may be detrimental to economic 
development.1
With the debate over the wisdom of free capital flows still raging, it is at least a little 
presumptuous to write a paper that explains how developing countries can increase their integration with 
world capital markets without first addressing the underlying assumption that such integration is 
beneficial. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section examines capital market liberalization, 
establishing that there are indeed substantial benefits to increased capital market integration. The 
increasingly popular, negative view of capital account liberalization comes about partly from a failure to 
distinguish between equity market liberalization and debt market liberalization. After equity market 
liberalization, capital becomes cheaper, investment booms, and economic growth increases. In contrast, 
liberalization of debt markets has often led to great difficulty, as banks, companies, and governments 
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 often become vulnerable to changes in financial market perceptions of their ability to pay back loans. 
The evidence outlined can be distilled into two key lessons. First, the liberalization of dollar-
denominated debt flows should proceed slowly and cautiously: Countries should refrain from premature 
liberalization of dollar-denominated foreign borrowing. The second lesson is that countries have thus far 
derived substantial economic benefits from opening their stock markets to foreign investors; there is no 
reason to think that future liberalizers will be any different in this respect. 
The second section turns to liberalization of the stock market. Although the effects of equity 
market liberalization are positive and substantial, they fall far short of the torrent of capital flow to the 
developing world implied by the theory of perfect markets. New theories in economics and finance 
developed over the past three decades have highlighted the inefficiencies that can result when not all 
parties to a transaction are equally well informed. Such asymmetric information problems can make 
investors reluctant to put their money in companies for two reasons. First, they may worry about the 
adverse selection or “lemons” problem, wherein only the worst companies offer their shares. Second, 
moral hazard or agency problems raise the concern that even money invested in a good company may be 
misspent on managerial perks or even stolen outright through accounting tricks. 
Over the past few years, cross-country econometric research on corporate governance, law, and 
finance has provided empirical support for the importance of such information problems. In addition, 
some of this research hints at the relative effectiveness of different reform strategies for increasing foreign 
participation in developing-country equity markets. However, given the relatively small number of 
countries with stock markets and the large number of plausible alternative explanations for large, 
prosperous equity markets, the statistical robustness of these conclusions cannot be taken for granted. 
Thus the findings of this research should be treated as tentative. Nevertheless, stronger laws and 
regulatory institutions that protect investors (whether domestic or foreign) from colluding insiders are 
strongly correlated with deeper and more robust equity markets. The third section discusses this literature 
and its policy implications in detail. A fourth section concludes. 
 
 
 Capital Account Liberalizations and Access to Global Finance 
Capital account liberalization was once seen as an inevitable step along the path to economic 
development for poor countries. Liberalizing the capital account, it was said, would permit financial 
resources to flow from capital-abundant countries, where expected returns were low, to capital-scarce 
countries, where expected returns were high. The flow of resources into the liberalizing countries would 
reduce their cost of capital, increase investment, and raise output.2 The principal policy question was not 
whether to liberalize the capital account, but when—before or after undertaking macroeconomic reforms 
such as stabilization of inflation and liberalization of trade.3 Or so the story went. 
In recent years intellectual opinion has moved against capital account liberalization. Financial 
crises in Asia, Russia, and Latin America have shifted the focus of the conversation from when countries 
should liberalize to whether they should do so at all. Opponents of the process argue that capital account 
liberalization invites speculative hot money flows, increases the likelihood of financial crises, and brings 
no discernible economic benefits. Some economists have gone so far as to suggest that open capital 
markets may even be detrimental to economic development.4 Must developing countries maintain 
financial self-sufficiency even as they reap the benefits of openness to trade? In reality, the choice is not 
so stark. 
Recent research demonstrates that the answer to the question “Is capital account liberalization 
helpful or harmful?” depends critically on the type of liberalization undertaken. While liberalization of 
debt flows has gotten many countries in trouble, liberalization of portfolio equity flows has been 
associated with booming stock markets, greater capital investment, and faster economic growth. 
In its broadest form, capital account liberalization can be any decision by a country’s government 
that allows capital to flow more freely in or out of that country. Allowing domestic businesses to obtain 
loans from foreign commercial banks, allowing foreigners to purchase domestic debt instruments (both 
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 corporate and sovereign), and allowing foreigners to invest in the domestic stock market are three 
examples. At a minimum, we need to distinguish between two categories of liberalization: those that 
involve debt and those that involve equity. Although this is an oversimplification, it is useful for driving 
home the following point. Debt financing and equity financing are different. This point may seem 
obvious, but it has gotten lost in the heated debate over whether developing countries should have open 
capital markets. 
A debt contract has very different characteristics from an equity contract. A debt contract requires 
regular payments regardless of the borrower’s economic circumstances, while an equity contract involves 
risk-sharing—large payouts for shareholders when times are good and little to nothing when times are 
bad. In other words, unlike debt servicing obligations, which are constant, variations in profits and 
dividends are procyclical and tend to stabilize the balance of payments.  
Liberalization of foreign borrowing restrictions typically leads to an over-reliance on debt 
financing for the liberalizing countries. In the 1970s countries became over-leveraged as governments 
obtained large quantities of floating-rate commercial bank loans. The 1980s debt crisis then demonstrated 
that the fixed-payment schedules of debt contracts can induce large inefficiencies when economic 
conditions turn out to be worse than anticipated at the time the debt contract was signed.5
Nor, as emphasized by John Williamson, “is it just the flow of payments to service the debt that 
theory suggests is more likely to vary in a stabilizing way for equity than for debt. The debt crisis was 
caused not just by high and variable interest rates magnifying the service payments due, and by the 
reduction in export earnings with which to service the debt, but most immediately and powerfully by the 
cutoff in new lending without any similar curb on the requirement to pay amortization.”6
At first glance, it may seem that foreign purchase of equities on the domestic stock market could 
also be reversed if and when foreign investors become concerned about a country’s prospects. But 
foreigners cannot simply demand their money back. They have to sell their shares. Prices will drop as 
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 soon as other market participants (domestic or foreign) anticipate the sudden increase in supply. 
Furthermore, as prices fall, expected returns rise so that the incentive to sell equity is no longer as strong. 
Loans, in contrast, have to be serviced even after adverse information becomes known, so that creditors 
rush to get their money while they can. In other words, the risk-sharing characteristics of an equity 
contract provide a kind of built-in stabilization mechanism, which suggests that foreign sales of portfolio 
equity are not likely to pose a particular threat to the domestic economy.7
In the 1990s countries turned to bonds instead of bank loans as their principal source of finance, 
but the outcome was largely the same. A number of economists have documented that excessive short-
term borrowing in dollars by banks, companies, and governments played a central role in the Asian 
financial crisis.8 In essence, the mismatch between the term structure of borrowers’ assets, which were 
typically long term and denominated in local currency, and their liabilities, which were short term and 
denominated in dollars, placed these countries in an extremely vulnerable position. Any bad news that 
made their lenders reluctant to extend new loans created an immediate liquidity problem. A bunching of 
long-term debt maturity profiles creates a similar vulnerability. Beyond the Asian crisis, it appears that 
excessive short-term borrowing in dollars played a central role in precipitating almost every emerging-
market financial crisis during the 1990s.9
Thus a key lesson is that once external debt flows have been liberalized, it is of utmost 
importance that the magnitude and maturity profile of the country’s external debt liabilities be compatible 
with the magnitude and maturity profile of its assets. That the liberalization of external debt financing can 
quickly generate liquidity problems for a country is a well-known phenomenon that dates back at least as 
far as Chile in the late 1970s.10
The empirical distinction between debt and equity flows is as important as the theoretical 
____________________ 
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 distinctions, because the composition of capital flows to developing countries has shifted drastically over 
the past twenty-five years. Table 7-1 breaks the composition of capital flows to developing countries into 
five major categories: public and publicly guaranteed debt flows, private nonguaranteed debt flows, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity, and grants. The sum of the first two categories reflects 
all debt flows to less-developed countries. There are three salient points to be made about table 7-1. 
First, the lion’s share of capital flows to developing countries from 1970 to 1984 took the form of 
debt. The five-year averages from 1970 to 1984 show that debt typically accounted for about 80 percent 
of all capital flows. Second, there were no portfolio equity flows to these countries from 1970 to 1984. 
The fact that portfolio equity flows were nonexistent is a direct consequence of the fact that these 
countries did not allow foreigners to own shares in their domestic stock markets (a point we revisit 
shortly). Third, a dramatic shift in the composition of these flows took place starting in the five-year 
period from 1985 to 1989. Portfolio equity flows as a fraction of total capital flows rose from less than 0.1 
percent in 1980–84 to 18.7 percent in 1990–95, an increase of almost two hundred fold. Debt flows as a 
fraction of total capital flows fell from 82 percent in 1980–84 to 50 percent in 1990–95. FDI flows as a 
fraction of total capital flows increased from 13 percent in 1980–84 to 28 percent in 1990–95. 
One of the principal reasons why countries became so reliant on debt during the 1970s was rather 
straightforward—foreign shareholding was banned. Countries could not rely on portfolio equity to 
finance development because their governments did not allow foreign investors to purchase shares in the 
domestic capital market. The import-substitution development strategy in vogue at the time discouraged 
integration with the global economy in general, and the writings of academic dependency theorists 
reinforced concerns about the negative political and economic consequences of widespread foreign 
ownership in particular.11
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, perhaps in part as a response to the debt crisis, countries all 
over the developing world decided to open their stock markets to foreign investment. Liberalizing the 
____________________ 
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 stock market—opening it to foreign investors—is one of the most important domestic capital reforms that 
developing countries can undertake and a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for increasing their 
access to global finance. 
 
Stock Market Liberalization 
Although numerous studies have shown that premature liberalization of dollar-denominated debt 
flows in the capital account has deleterious effects, there has been a relative dearth of evidence on the 
effects of equity market liberalizations. Recent work has begun to address this deficiency, and a 
consensus is forming that equity market liberalization reduces developing countries’ cost of capital.12
Identifying the date of stock market liberalization is the first step in determining whether stock 
market liberalization has any discernible economic effect. Since markets are forward-looking, the most 
important question is, when does the market first learn of a credible, impending liberalization? In 
principle, identifying a liberalization date involves simply finding the date on which the government 
declares that foreigners may purchase domestic shares. In practice, the liberalization process is not so 
transparent. In many cases, there is no obvious government declaration or policy decree. 
When there is no salient liberalization decree, liberalization is taken here to be the date on which 
a closed-end country fund was established. Closed-end funds are often the impetus for a spate of 
subsequent market openings, which further increase integration.13 Table 7-2 presents a list of the eighteen 
countries in the sample, the date of their first stock market liberalization, and the means by which they 
liberalized. For example, the table shows that the modal means of liberalization occurred through the 
establishment of a closed-end country fund.14
____________________ 
11. See Cardoso and Faletto (1979); Evans (1979). 
12. See Bekaert and Harvey (2000); Henry (2000a, 2000b, 2003); Martell and Stulz (2003); Stulz (1999); Tesar and 
Werner (1998). 
13. Bekaert and Harvey (2000); Henry (2000a).  
14. While there is broad agreement that liberalization reduces the cost of capital, there is some disagreement about 
the exact timing of liberalizations. This matters, in principle, because the estimated size of the reduction in the cost 
 
 The establishment of a country fund in particular—and stock market liberalizations in general—
may seem like a narrow way to define capital account liberalization, but it is precisely the narrowness of 
stock market liberalizations that make them more useful for two specific reasons. First, focusing on stock 
markets alone helps us to distinguish the consequences of equity market liberalization from those of debt 
market liberalization. Second, studies that use broad indicators of liberalization focus on cross-sectional 
data, examining the long-run correlation between average openness and average investment.15 Examining 
the correlation between average openness and investment tells us whether investment rates are 
permanently higher in countries with capital accounts that are more open. The problem with this approach 
is that economic theory makes no such prediction. 
What the theory does predict is that capital-poor countries will experience a temporary increase in 
investment when they liberalize. Hence, the relevant issue is not whether countries with open capital 
accounts have higher investment rates, but whether investment rates increase in the immediate aftermath 
of liberalization. The most transparent way of testing this prediction is to compare investment rates during 
episodes of liberalization with investment rates during periods of no liberalization. Because they 
constitute a radical shift in the degree of capital account openness, stock market liberalizations provide 
ideal natural experiments for confronting the theory with data. 
 
Stock Market Liberalizations: The Cost of Capital, Investment, and Growth 
The data indicate that, on average, opening up to foreign shareholders leads to a 38 percent 
increase in the real dollar value of the stock markets in liberalizing countries.16 Stock market 
liberalization does not alter the functioning of these companies in any way; liberalization only changes 
____________________ 
of capital depends on the liberalization date one chooses. However, changing liberalization dates has virtually no 
effect on the basic conclusion. All of the evidence we have indicates that liberalization reduces the cost of capital 
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15. See for example, Rodrik (1998). 
16. Henry (2000a). This number varies according to the liberalization date. Martell and Stulz (2003) report even 
larger effects. 
 
 the ownership of the shares of the companies listed on a country’s stock exchange. Then, is the increase in 
share prices evidence that liberalization drives domestic stock prices away from the fundamentals and 
leads to stock market bubbles? Not necessarily. 
The price of a stock depends on the expected future dividends to be paid by that stock and the 
discount rate shareholders apply to those expected future dividends. The discount rate has two 
components: the interest rate and the equity premium. Liberalization reduces interest rates through the 
inflow of foreign funds from countries with more plentiful capital. Stock market liberalization also 
reduces the equity premium, because emerging-market stocks provide diversification benefits for 
investors in countries like the United States.17 In other words, stock market liberalization leads to a lower 
cost of equity capital. Thus there are sound fundamental reasons for share prices to rise when the stock 
market is liberalized, and we seem to observe this in reality. 
Exactly who benefits from the increase in share prices and the decline in the cost of capital? 
Clearly, domestic shareholders benefit: Those who sell their shares realize capital gains, and those who 
continue to hold their shares see the value of their portfolios increase. Some foreign shareholders may 
reap immediate capital gains if they get in early on the country’s “initial public offering,” but the more 
important benefit is the long-term reduction in risk they get from diversifying their portfolios.  
Domestic residents who do not own shares also benefit from liberalization, although for less 
obvious reasons. When a stock market increases in value, this is equivalent to a fall in the cost of capital 
through that market. For a given capital-raising requirement, a higher stock price means that fewer shares 
need to be issued. Figure 7-1 illustrates the fall in the cost of capital that occurs when developing 
countries liberalize the stock market. The figure plots the average aggregate dividend yield across the 
liberalizing countries in event time (year 0 is the year of liberalization). The average dividend yield falls 
roughly 240 basis points—from an average level of 5.0 percent in the five years prior to liberalization to 
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 18an average of 2.6 percent in the five years following liberalization.
Although the immediate effect of liberalization is to raise share prices and lower the cost of 
capital, this is not the end of the story. The lower cost of capital encourages firms to build new factories 
and install new machines because some investment projects that were not profitable before the stock 
market liberalization are profitable after liberalization. 
The increased investment that should result from stock market liberalization is particularly 
important for emerging economies, because more investment should lead to faster economic growth and 
higher wages for workers.19 Thus stock market liberalization should generate substantial economic 
benefits, even for those individuals who did not own shares before the liberalization and therefore do not 
reap the capital gains associated with the increase in share prices. 
It sounds plausible that a lower cost of capital should lead to increased investment, but what is the 
reality? Figure 7-2 demonstrates that, on average, countries experience an increase in investment when 
they liberalize the stock market. The growth rate of the capital stock rises 1.1 percentage points in the 
aftermath of liberalization—from an average of 5.4 percent a year in the period before to an average of 
6.5 percent in the period after liberalization. 
While liberalization leads to a sharp increase in investment on average, it is also important to 
know whether this is a uniform effect: Do all countries experience higher investment, or do just a select 
few drive the results? In order to address this question, recent research looks at the results on a country-
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 by-country basis. In one study, only two of the countries in the sample did not experience abnormally 
high rates of investment in the first year after liberalization. In the second year after liberalization, only 
one of the countries did not experience abnormally high rates of investment.20
Theory also tells us that increased investment should raise productivity and economic growth. 
Figure 7-3 shows that, as predicted, the growth rate of output per worker rises in the aftermath of 
liberalization—from an average of 1.4 percent a year in the period before to an average of 3.7 percent a 
year in the period after liberalization. 
 
Stock Market Liberalization and Other Economic Reforms 
Stock market liberalizations are usually accompanied by other economic reforms. Therefore, it is 
important to ask whether these economic reforms would have caused large increases in stock prices, 
investment, and growth, even if there had not been any stock market liberalization. While the financial 
and economic effects of stock market liberalization remain statistically and economically significant after 
controlling for contemporaneous reforms, the other economic reforms are also important sources of 
growth. 
To see the point, consider in greater detail the result illustrated by figure 7-3: per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth increases following liberalization. On the one hand, there is nothing 
surprising about figure 7-3. Whereas figures 7-1 and 7-2 document behavioral responses of prices and 
quantities of capital to liberalization, figure 7-3 simply provides a mechanical check of the standard 
growth-accounting equation:  
( )ˆˆ ˆ 1Y A K Lα α= + + −(7-1) ˆ
                                                
,  
where a circumflex over a variable denotes the change in the natural log of that variable.21
 
20. Henry (2000b). 
21. In words, this equation says that the growth rate of output equals the growth rate of total factor productivity plus 
capital’s share in output (α) times the growth rate of the capital stock plus labor’s share in output (1 - α) times the 
 
 The interesting point about figure 7-3 is that the increase in the growth rate of output per worker 
is too large to be explained by the increase in investment. A few simple calculations illustrate the point. 
The elasticity of output with respect to capital,α , is typically around 0.33. So, based on figure 7-2, we 
would expect the growth rate of output per worker after liberalization to be about 0.363 (0.33 times 1.1) 
percentage points higher. But figure 7-3 displays a 2.3 percentage point increase in the growth rate of 
output per worker. All else equal, a 1.1 percentage point increase in the growth rate of the capital stock 
can produce a 2.3 percentage point increase in the growth rate of output per worker only if the elasticity 
of output with respect to capital is on the order of 2! 
The increase in growth due to liberalization is slightly larger than 1 percentage point after 
controlling for a number of variables.22 Nevertheless, this finding still requires an elasticity of output with 
respect to capital that is greater than 1. What explains the inconsistency of this finding with standard 
production theory? The answer, of course, is total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Equation 7-1 shows 
that any increase in the rate of growth of output that is not accounted for by an increase in the growth rate 
of capital and labor must be the result of an increase in , the growth rate of TFP. While we typically 
interpret  as the growth rate of the stock of productive ideas or technology, any economic reform that 
raises the efficiency of a given stock of capital and labor also increases , even in the absence of 
technological change. 
Aˆ
Aˆ
Aˆ
Economic institutions and social infrastructure can also be crucial in determining the level of 
human capital accumulation and in turn setting the marginal product of capital.23 In other words, the rate 
of return to capital may be low because emerging economies fail to create an environment where (1) 
entrepreneurs are free to pursue new productive opportunities and (2) lenders have an incentive to extend 
capital to the private sector. 
____________________ 
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both sides and differentiating with respect to time, yields this equation. 
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23. Kremer (1993). 
 
 Consider the gap between G-7 countries and emerging economies using some common measures 
of institutional development. According to one measure of social infrastructure,24 the median G-7 country 
ranks fourteenth of 130 countries, while the median emerging economy ranks sixty-fourth.25 A look at the 
Heritage House 2003 Index of Economic Freedom yields similar results. Out of 161 countries, the median 
G-7 country ranks nineteenth, and the median emerging economy ranks seventy-second.26
Stock market liberalization commonly takes place concurrently with a number of other 
institutional and macroeconomic reforms. Because of this, it is important to think carefully about how to 
interpret the data. Consider a few simple pictures. Standard trade theory predicts that trade liberalization 
will increase TFP. As countries tilt production toward their comparative advantage, they experience an 
increase in output for a given stock of capital and labor. Figure 7-4 plots the average growth rate of output 
per worker across all of the countries in the sample following trade liberalization.27 The figure shows that 
the average growth rate of output per worker rises 1.5 percentage points following trade liberalization—
from an average of 0.6 percent a year in the five years preceding trade liberalization to an average of 2.1 
percent a year in the five years after. 
Stabilizing inflation may also increase TFP, because high inflation generates incentives for 
workers and producers to divert resources away from productive activities and toward activities that help 
them to avoid the costs of high inflation. Economic research has found that stabilizing high inflation is 
good for asset prices, investment, and output.28 Figure 7-5 plots the average growth rate of output per 
worker across all of the countries in the sample following inflation stabilization programs.29 Figure 7-5 
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28. Calvo and Végh (1998); Easterly (1996); Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (2002); Henry (2000b, 2002).  
29. The inflation stabilization dates are taken from Henry (2002). In countries with multiple stabilization dates, the 
last date was chosen. 
 
 shows that the growth rate of output per worker rises 0.8 percentage points following stabilization 
programs—from an average of 0.8 percent a year in the five years preceding stabilization to an average of 
1.6 percent a year in the five years following stabilization.  
Pictures are not conclusive, of course. To reach more reliable conclusions, one must work 
carefully to disentangle the effects of these and other reforms on growth. Our only point is that there are 
strong a priori theoretical reasons to expect reforms other than equity market liberalization to have a 
significant effect on economic growth. The raw data do no harm to this view and provide strong prima 
facie evidence that factors not related to capital markets play a significant role in explaining the increase 
in growth during the period after liberalization. 
Hence, although this paper focuses primarily on the ways in which domestic capital market 
reforms can improve developing countries’ access to capital, we would be remiss not to underscore the 
following point. Domestic reforms that improve the efficiency with which capital is utilized are at least as 
important as reforms increasing the quantity of capital that domestic markets are able to attract. In 
addition to macroeconomic reforms such as inflation stabilization and trade liberalization, reforms that 
improve the efficiency with which capital gets allocated can also raise TFP growth. 
 
Investor Protection and Access to Global Finance 
We have shown that whether liberalization succeeds or fails depends crucially on whether it is 
equity market liberalization or debt market liberalization. In general, liberalizing debt flows leads to 
crises, while liberalizing portfolio equity flows is associated with higher asset valuations, greater capital 
investment, and faster economic growth. The contrasting evidence on the effects of debt versus equity 
flows suggests that there may be a need for developing countries to shift their financing toward equity and 
away from debt. 
But it is important to remember that international finance is a two-way street—borrowing 
requires lending. Therefore, policymakers must ask the following: Given the preferences of developed-
country suppliers of capital, what steps can be taken to shift the equilibrium financial mix toward equity 
 
 and away from debt? Permitting foreign investors to hold stocks is a necessary step but is not sufficient 
by itself. We now explore the potential causes of an over-reliance on debt and suggest some steps that 
countries can undertake to remedy the situation. 
Equity flows to developing countries have fallen far short of what one would expect given the 
scarcity of capital in these countries. Capital flows may be heavily tilted toward debt over equity because 
of institutions that intentionally or unintentionally skew the equilibrium mix. Even the initial boom in 
emerging stock markets led to much smaller increases in valuations (declines in the cost of capital) than 
one would expect to occur with the entry of foreign investors.30 Since the initial boom of the early 1990s, 
the flow of portfolio equity to emerging markets has slowed.31 While a recent study by the World Bank 
shows that developing countries’ ratios of external debt to equity fell between 1997 and 2001, it is still 
not clear that they have fallen to prudent levels.32
Before one can prescribe a solution to the problem of weak equity flows, however, one must first 
identify the cause of the problem. At first glance, one is tempted to resort to home bias as an 
explanation.33 Does the fact that foreign investors hold far too few foreign securities account for 
developing countries’ high ratios of debt to equity? No. Home bias can help to explain why overall levels 
of capital flows to developing countries are not what we would expect them to be. But home bias alone 
cannot explain why the composition of capital flows to developing countries is skewed toward debt over 
equity. 
Put another way, taking the overall inflow of capital to developing countries as given, why do we 
see so little in the way of portfolio equity inflows relative to debt inflows? Two linked explanations 
suggest themselves. First, lack of transparency in equity markets makes investors reluctant to invest in 
emerging-market stocks; second, weak protection of the rights of equity investors reinforces the tendency 
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 of capital suppliers to purchase debt rather than equity. We now discuss the economic theory behind these 
explanations before moving on to the accumulating empirical evidence supporting them. 
 
Asymmetric Information and Finance 
New theories in economics and finance developed over the past three decades have highlighted 
the inefficiencies that can result when not all parties to a transaction are equally well informed. Such 
asymmetric information problems can make investors reluctant to put their money in companies due to 
the problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, or both. If good companies are indistinguishable from 
bad companies, investors can only safely assume that all companies are bad. In that case, good companies 
will not receive a high enough price for their shares and will not list shares on the market, thus confirming 
investors’ negative beliefs. Second, investors may be concerned about moral hazard or agency problems. 
Money invested in a good company may be misspent on unnecessary managerial perks or even stolen 
outright where accounting standards and enforcement bodies do not exist to restrain insiders.34 These 
insiders may be controlling shareholders, such as a founding family, a firm’s top managers, or both. 
A new literature on law and finance has found strong support for the importance of these legal 
and institutional factors in explaining why the magnitude of capital flows from rich to poor countries is 
smaller than we would otherwise expect. The degree to which a country’s law protects the legal rights of 
minority shareholders exerts a significant influence on the size and robustness of capital markets.35 If 
investors get poor protection from a country, they will stay away. Table 7-3 shows that developing 
countries rank lower than developed countries on every major measure of investor protection: shareholder 
rights, creditor rights, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, and rating of the accounting system. This 
underscores our point that allowing foreign investors into the country is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for increased capital market integration. 
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 For example, Shleifer and Wolfenzon show that weaker investor protection may reduce the 
marginal product of capital and can eliminate the incentive for capital to flow from rich to poor countries. 
According to their argument, the amount of capital that does flow to emerging economies is only a 
fraction of what we would see in a world where minority shareholders in these countries enjoyed the same 
legal protection as their U.S. counterparts.36 In other words, stock market liberalization is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for increased access to global equity capital. 
The drastically lower capital-to-labor ratios in emerging economies may not translate into higher 
rates of return if there are significant cross-country differences in investor protection. We can think about 
such a claim in terms of the standard production theory discussed earlier. While economists have 
traditionally interpreted the parameter A in the production function as the stock of ideas, A is really an 
index of the efficiency with which a given stock of K and L can be transformed into Y.37 Therefore, any 
economic reform that raises the efficiency of a given stock of capital and labor will also increase , even 
in the absence of technological change. Holding the stock of ideas constant, government distortions may 
reduce A and lead to lower rates of return to capital than we would otherwise expect. 
A
Ineffective investor protection is an important example of such a distortion. Since outside 
investors (whether foreign or domestic) know less about the firm’s prospects and the behavior of the 
managers running it than do insiders, they will demand higher returns or stay out entirely. By mitigating 
the effects of asymmetric information, strong investor protection may help countries to attract more 
international capital. More protection should keep mobile domestic capital from leaving or being kept out 
of the financial markets and saved as cash or in nonfinancial assets (such as land or jewelry). Finally, 
better disclosure will improve efficiency regardless of whether protections increase the total stock of 
capital, thus helping countries to make better use of the capital they already have. 
Institutions to mitigate moral hazard improve the ability of investors to monitor how their money 
is being used and make it easier for investors to step in when insiders start to misuse their power. In 
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 contrast, if some shareholders have disproportionate influence over the firm’s policies, or if minority 
shareholders face roadblocks to active participation in decisionmaking, outside investors will hesitate to 
risk their money at such a firm, thus raising its cost of capital. 
Institutions to mitigate adverse selection require firms listing new securities to provide more 
information and make them legally liable for the quality of this information. Because minority 
shareholders are unlikely to take an interest in the governance of a single firm when it is easier simply to 
sell the shares, it has also been suggested that it would be beneficial to have a strong public regulator with 
the incentives and capabilities to act on their behalf. 
An important point of contention has been over who needs this protection. American research on 
corporate governance initially concerned itself with the problem of managers of a widely held firm with 
few concentrated shareholders. Because no individual shareholder owned enough shares of one firm to 
make it worth the effort to monitor, the concern was that managers would not be accountable. Outside the 
United States, however, the widely held firm is a rarity. Instead, most firms have a single dominant 
shareholder or group of shareholders (often the founding family or a government shareholder) that keeps 
close track of the business and may include the chief executive officer and other top managers.38 For this 
reason, we refer to “insiders” in general, leaving open the possibility that they may be managers, large 
shareholders, or both in any given company. 
  
Firm-level Corporate Governance 
One growing body of research has explored the relationship of firm-level corporate governance 
practices to valuations or performance. While the results of this research point to the value of good 
governance for firms, it fails to rule out crucial alternative theories and does not indicate whether there is 
a useful role for governments to play. 
In general, firms with better corporate governance practices have better performance and higher 
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 39valuations, especially in countries where the overall legal system is weak.  A study of almost 3,000 
Asian corporations found that a mismatch of cash flow rights to voting rights, such as through violations 
of “one-share, one-vote,” through cross-shareholdings, or through pyramid ownership structures, is 
associated with significantly lower firm valuation.40 When surveyed, international investors have reported 
that they would avoid companies and countries with poor corporate governance.41
However, the policy implications of this are not entirely straightforward. The most obvious 
interpretation of the research is that if firms would only improve their corporate governance, they would 
have cheaper access to capital. This fails to address the question of why these companies have not done so 
already. Were they simply unaware that minority shareholders would require a higher return in order to 
invest in companies with opaque or exclusionary corporate governance practices? Alternatively, we must 
consider the possibility that these policies were consciously chosen. In that case, we need to understand 
why firm insiders decided that allowing more outside observation of and influence on corporate decisions 
was not worth the cost. 
One possible cost is that shareholder involvement keeps the firm from making the best strategic 
decisions. It has been argued that the extra bureaucracy involved with fulfilling corporate governance 
requirements slows down firm decisionmaking. In a similar vein, the pressure to make quarterly results 
and to justify corporate decisions to the public could keep executives from taking a longer-term strategy. 
Another cost is that of disclosure. More public disclosure makes it harder to keep profitable lines of 
business out of the view of competitors. These costs reduce the value of the firm to all shareholders and 
hence could be good reasons for the failure to adopt corporate governance “best practices.” 
A more cynical view is that firms would benefit from the cheaper capital they could receive if 
they improved their governance but that insiders benefit more from continuing to extract rents from the 
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 current “captive” shareholders than they would from taking their honest share of a well-governed firm. 
Alternatively, there might be some sort of coordination problem. If all firms in a country have significant 
internal governance problems, the first firm to reform might risk looking worse than other firms. For 
instance, if most firms in a country are reporting profits, but only because they violate international 
accounting standards in some respect, the first firm to switch over and admit it is running a loss may not 
benefit. If all firms are compelled to switch together, then the better firms will stand out. 
Thus this firm-level research has ambiguous policy implications. Regulating stronger corporate 
governance measures from every firm in an economy when these firms have already demonstrated 
through their own choices that they do not want better corporate governance only makes sense under 
some circumstances. Otherwise it might harm the firms more than help them. The results of firm-level 
research do not help to answer this question, because they are consistent with either hypothesis.  
 
Measuring Investor Protection 
In recent years a growing body of econometric research has demonstrated that economies with 
fewer protections for minority shareholders, with weaker legal systems, or with reputations for corruption 
have smaller and weaker financial systems and grow more slowly. Such institutional problems not only 
make it harder for firms to access international capital but also make it harder for firms to convince 
domestic investors to entrust the firms with their money, reducing growth even in a closed economy. 
Both the desired outcome (capital market development) and the proposed influences on it 
(effective legal systems, transparency, and so forth) can be measured in a variety of ways. The influences 
are particularly difficult to assess rigorously. Following the example of earlier cross-country research on 
the correlates of overall economic growth, initial work primarily used general indexes of “law and order,” 
“rule of law,” or “corruption” created by private business risk advisory services, by think tanks, or by 
investment banks.42
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 Such indexes have three main problems. The first is that these measures are somewhat subjective, 
giving substantial weight to the personal assessments of analysts or surveyed businesspeople. This affects 
their comparability and obscures what they are actually measuring. The second is that they are not 
focused on financial markets in particular, which may be more or less law-abiding than other parts of the 
economy. Finally, and perhaps most important for the present discussion, results based on such studies 
provide only very general policy implications. A reputation for corruption and an ineffective legal system 
are bad for the entire economy, not just for the financial sector, and there is no universally accepted 
“cure” for these ills. 
A new wave of economic research has attempted to remedy this deficiency by systematically 
measuring specific financial regulations and institutions and statistically testing their effects. In the first 
major effort in this direction, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny examine the financial laws 
and regulations of forty-nine countries to determine what level of protection they afford to creditors and 
shareholders.43 This work focuses on aspects of company law that might (in theory) act to mitigate the 
moral hazard problem. 
Shareholder rights are measured by seven indicators, each taking a value of 1 if a particular law 
works in favor of minority shareholders and a value of 0 otherwise. Six of these are summed into an 
“antidirector rights” score that ranges from 0 to 6. The first antidirector right is proxy by mail. If small 
shareholders must personally attend annual meetings in order for their voices to be heard, they are 
unlikely to do so and thus are effectively disenfranchised. The second, “shares not blocked,” refers to a 
requirement in some countries that shareholders temporarily deposit their shares with the company or an 
intermediary in order to participate in general shareholders’ meetings. Such provisions make it more 
difficult for shareholders to participate in corporate governance and restrict their ability to react to the 
meeting’s events by trading immediately. The third right indicates whether voting rules give small 
shareholders a good opportunity to get a board representative through proportional voting or other means. 
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 Countries earn the fourth point of the antidirector score if minority shareholders have means to challenge 
the company’s or the board’s decisions in court. The fifth point comes from requiring a relatively low 
percentage of shares in order to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting, and the sixth comes from 
granting preemptive rights to existing shareholders to buy new issues. 
Another crucial shareholder right, “one-share, one-vote,” is kept separate from the basic index of 
antidirector rights because it has a somewhat different nature. This right indicates whether cash flow 
rights match voting rights. Where these rights do not match, some shareholders have disproportionate 
control over the firm. If these shareholders act to ensure the firm’s long-term profitability and dividend 
distributions, then any additional voting rights are without value. In practice, a premium usually is 
associated with multiple voting shares, which suggests that the extra control over the firm pays off 
through something other than share appreciation or dividends.44
Creditor rights are measured with a four-point scale. The first point is earned if restrictions are 
placed on firms going into reorganization, since reorganization shelters debtors from their obligations to 
creditors. The second is earned if no automatic stay is placed on secured assets in reorganization, meaning 
that creditors can reclaim their collateral even in reorganization. The third point comes if secured 
creditors receive priority over other creditors such as the government or employees. The fourth point is 
earned if in reorganization management is automatically fired or the firm is placed under the supervision 
of a court or creditor-appointed agent. 
There are a number of trade-offs to be made in the choice of data. First, financial laws and 
regulations in any country are far more complicated than can be represented in a simple index of rights. It 
might well be that some unique characteristic of the laws of one country gives shareholders much stronger 
or weaker rights than this index indicates. Alternatively, actual practice may be quite different from the 
laws on the books, with much stricter or weaker enforcement because of cultural or political factors. 
However, sensitivity to these nuances has only been achieved by using subjective ratings from country 
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 experts, which has a high cost in terms of consistency and comparability across countries. 
The other trade-off is that these two measures focus only on the protection of the rights of 
shareholders and creditors after they have purchased the shares or bonds or made the loans. Although 
these are crucial in mitigating the moral hazard problem, they do not address the adverse selection 
problem. Recently, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer have collected a new set of data on laws 
dealing with the issuing of new securities, one that addresses the means by which securities purchasers 
can have confidence in the quality of the financial assets they are purchasing.45 We discuss this at more 
length, after first examining what researchers have uncovered over the past six years using the initial data 
set described above. 
The central finding of this research is that, as suspected, countries that have put in place fewer of 
these protections have smaller and weaker capital markets. To evaluate the strength of stock markets, La 
Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny use three outcome measures.46 First, they estimate the 
value of listed shares held by minority shareholders and compare that to GDP. They also look at the total 
number of listed firms and at the annual number of initial public offerings relative to population—seeing 
more firms on the market suggests that equity markets have been an attractive and feasible source of 
capital and seeing more initial public offerings confirms that they remain so. Controlling for rule of law 
(using a rating from the International Country Risk Guide), GDP growth, and gross national product 
(GNP), they find that antidirector rights have a statistically significant effect on all three outcome 
measures but that one-share, one-vote does not.47
These effects are sharply attenuated or disappear when another factor is taken into account: the 
origin of the country’s company law. Countries that have a company law based on the English common-
law model, whether because of colonial legacy or some other connection, have larger capital markets. 
Countries that follow continental European models based on a civil law tradition, such as the German or 
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 French, have significantly smaller equity markets. Although this reinforces the view that law matters for 
security markets, these measures of investor rights do not capture the most crucial ways in which it does 
so. As expected, overall rule of law also has a significant effect on the number of listed firms and the 
number of initial public offerings and, to a lesser extent, on the ratio of market capitalization to GDP. 
For credit markets, which are less public and thus harder to measure, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny use the sum of all private sector bank debt and all outstanding corporate bonds, 
divided by GNP.48 Stronger creditor rights have the expected effect of increasing total debt, but this effect 
is not statistically significant and is swamped once legal origin is taken into account. 
The overall statistical weakness of these results might lead one to discount the importance of the 
specific shareholder and creditor rights measured, but this would not be the correct conclusion. First, the 
sample includes only a cross section of forty-nine countries, meaning only the most dramatic effects could 
be expected to show up as statistically significant. Second, these indexes measure only a few aspects of a 
variety of complex legal codes and practices. Countries with weaker investor rights by the main measures 
used may have compensating measures such as mandatory dividends for listed firms or legal reserve 
requirements for borrower firms.49 Third, regardless of the control variables used or the outcome variable 
chosen, strengthening the rights of shareholders and creditors has a positive effect on the size of capital 
markets. The lesson for policymakers should not be that the research lays out the best recipe for bigger 
capital markets but rather that protection of minority rights, in one form or another, must be among the 
ingredients. 
Examination of other characteristics of financial systems with different rules reinforces the 
importance of shareholder rights. Ownership of large public companies is significantly more concentrated 
in countries with weaker investor protections.50 This suggests that these firms missed opportunities to 
bring in more capital for investment through broad issuance of equity shares and that the investors in 
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 these firms are less diversified than they could be. 
In addition, firms in countries with stronger shareholder rights pay out more dividends than do 
firms in the same industries in countries with weaker shareholder rights.51 Perhaps more important, 
rapidly growing firms in a country with strong shareholder protections pay less in dividends than do 
slowly growing firms in the same country, but this is not true in countries without such protections. This 
implies that less-protected investors feel compelled to extract dividends from their investments in high-
growth firms every year because they are not certain that these cash flows will be used wisely or 
distributed to shareholders later. This apparent need to maintain credibility by paying dividends may 
restrict the ability of firms to raise capital for longer-term investments or to pursue the best opportunities 
available. Firms located in countries with weaker investor protections have lower market valuations 
relative to their book assets, again supporting the basic result that investors in these countries do not trust 
firms to use their assets effectively or to pay out profits in dividends.52
Other researchers have used this data set to test further implications of the theory. Countries with 
stronger minority shareholder rights have more efficient capital allocation overall. In particular, these 
countries see less over-investment in declining industries.53 In countries with weaker investor protections, 
insiders are compelled to hold a larger share of their firms (and thus not diversify) as an extra assurance to 
outside investors that they will run the firm to maximize profits.54
Dyck and Zingales analyze transactions in which a controlling stake is sold as a block. They infer 
that the premium paid in such transactions above the market price reflects the extra value of control 
rights, as opposed to the cash flow rights of shares sold one-by-one. Where those premiums are high, 
capital markets are less developed and ownership is more concentrated, suggesting that these premiums 
are a good measure of market inefficiency. They find that more shareholder rights and more effective law 
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 enforcement are associated with lower control premiums. This again supports the idea that controlling 
shareholders are less able to extract “private benefits” from a company when shareholder rights are in 
place, which should make investors more confident in investing in such economies. They also find that 
low private benefits are associated with wide circulation of daily newspapers, high rates of tax 
compliance, and competitive product markets.55
Investor rights not only affect how well markets function in normal times but also play a role in 
crises. Countries with weak corporate governance were particularly hard hit in the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997–98. In fact, it has been argued that weak corporate governance played a greater role than did 
conventional macroeconomic variables such as government budget balance, current account deficits, or 
foreign debt. This may occur because insiders are more likely to start or increase the pace of expropriation 
of the assets of a company during a downturn, if investors are unprotected. Knowing this, investors will 
pull out rapidly when conditions become unfavorable, contributing to a downward spiral such as that 
observed in Asia.56
 
Mitigating Adverse Selection through Public and Private Enforcement 
In their next wave of data collection, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer turn to securities 
law relating to initial public offerings.57 As mentioned, these laws can be viewed as attempts to deal with 
the adverse selection or “lemons” problem, making investors more confident that a firm issuing new 
equity has told the truth about its financial situation. In collecting these new data, the researchers address 
this question at three levels. First, they assess the theoretical arguments that securities laws are potentially 
harmful because they keep firms and investors from independently making whatever arrangements are 
best for them. Second, even if law is helpful, it might work through effective public enforcement or it 
might work through “private enforcement,” making it easier for private parties to make informed 
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 decisions and to take action when deceived. Finally, the researchers go further into the details of specific 
laws to see which appear to be most effective and whether that varies with context. 
This new study analyzes data on twenty-two aspects of securities law, across the same forty-nine 
countries with large stock markets that were in the earlier database. As in the 1998 study, La Porta, 
López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer consider the three outcome variables of market capitalization to GDP, 
number of listed firms per capita, and number of initial public offerings per capita.58 On their first 
question, whether law matters at all, they answer “a definite yes,” echoing their earlier results. 
Having dealt with the not-entirely-straw man of the efficiently lawless equity market, they go on 
to examine what does work in more detail. The obvious theoretical alternative to relying solely on the 
market is to rely solely on public enforcement, a strong independent government regulator that they call 
the supervisor. However, they find somewhat mixed evidence for the value of this. Contrary to 
expectations, it does not seem to matter whether the supervisor is insulated from political influence, nor 
does it matter if the supervisor’s resources are thinly spread across multiple areas of responsibility (for 
example, both banking and market supervision). Furthermore, the ability of the supervisor to issue 
criminal sanctions against issuers, distributors, or accountants is not associated with larger financial 
markets. However, giving the supervisor power to make regulations, to command documents from firms, 
and to order market participants to take or refrain from taking specific actions (such as disclosing certain 
information to the public or paying compensation to investors) is associated with larger securities markets 
relative to GDP. 
La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer find stronger evidence for the efficacy of a third way, 
what they call “private enforcement.” Laws can facilitate private enforcement first by ensuring that 
investors have the information they need and second by making it easier for them to take legal action 
when they believe they have been deceived. This first aspect is measured by tallying up disclosure 
requirements in the law. Legal systems are ranked higher on this scale for requiring that firms deliver a 
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 prospectus to investors before listing, for requiring more detail on directors’ compensation, for requiring 
more detail on the issuer’s ownership structure (especially insider ownership), and for requiring 
disclosure of irregular contracts and related-party transactions. Stricter disclosure requirements are highly 
correlated with securities market development. 
The second aspect of private enforcement is quantified by examining where the burden of proof is 
placed in civil suits, should the investors believe that material information was left out of the prospectus. 
In the least investor-friendly regimes, investors must prove that defendants were grossly negligent or 
deliberately fraudulent, while at the opposite extreme defendants may be required to prove that they 
conducted due diligence or may even have no defense if they excluded important information for any 
reason. These standards are rated separately for distributors, issuers, and accountants. An additional 
criterion, whether distributors are expected to conduct due diligence on the prospectus, is added together 
with these to construct a burden of proof index. This index is also highly correlated with strong equity 
markets. 
In addition to measuring the direct effects of these different laws, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer find support for an important interaction effect. Public enforcement works well in countries with 
an efficient judicial system, but not in countries with a weak judicial system. In contrast, private 
enforcement works well in either environment. This suggests that developing countries with an imperfect 
judicial system might find more immediate success facilitating private enforcement, since this could 
succeed in bringing in more investment even without the broader systemic reforms that might be 
necessary to fix a dysfunctional judiciary. 
Furthermore, unlike the antidirector rights index, these effects do not become insignificant when 
controlling for legal origin. In fact, the strong negative effect of French legal origin itself disappears in 
most of the measures. When these securities laws are included in a regression together with antidirector 
rights, antidirector rights become insignificant. This suggests that all of the earlier results that relied on 
the shareholder rights indexes may have been proxying for these securities laws. That is, “French legal 
origin” describes a package of laws and regulations that tend to go together, including weak shareholder 
 
 rights. Saying a country has “weak shareholder rights” (by the measures of La Porta, López-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny) is thus nearly indistinguishable from saying a country has a continental European 
legal origin, especially given the inherently small samples of cross-country regressions. But these newer 
results suggest that legal origin itself is just a proxy for other aspects of the system, such as these 
securities laws. 
 
Conclusions 
What can developing countries take away from this research? First, they need not forgo the 
benefits of foreign investment in order to avoid being buffeted randomly by the winds of global investor 
sentiment. Equity market liberalization appears to be a safe and healthy alternative to debt dependency. 
Second, developing countries must recognize that opening up to foreign equity investment is necessary 
but not sufficient to ensure these inward flows. The lists of laws that La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer amalgamate into their various indexes might have the appearance of a recipe for strong markets: 
Put in place these rules, and international capital will flow in. Such a conclusion would be hasty, for a 
number of reasons. What we can say, however, is that laws, regulations, and government institutions can 
play an important role in mitigating problems of moral hazard and asymmetric information for investors 
and that this will help capital markets to grow. 
The main problem with drawing direct prescriptions from this research is that it is unclear what 
the crucial elements are from the whole package of institutional features. With only a cross section of 
forty-nine countries to compare, we cannot draw a clear statistical distinction between the effects of any 
of these institutional features. It appears that the positive effect of antidirector rights found with the earlier 
data might just be a proxy for other aspects of securities law.59 Thus putting the set of antidirector rights 
into law without making other changes might have no effect or could even have unexpected negative 
effects. We might be more confident if we had systematic before-and-after data on put-in-place new laws, 
                                                 
59. La Porta and others (2002). 
 
 but such data have not yet been collected. 
Nevertheless, both theory and empirics point in the same general direction. More protection for 
shareholders is strongly associated with the size, efficiency, and stability of equity markets. The most 
recent findings of La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer also suggest that cheaper reforms might 
actually be more effective. Rather than setting up a powerful independent supervisor responsible for 
criminal prosecution of market actors, governments might do just as well by simply requiring more 
disclosure of firms and making them responsible in civil court for these disclosures. This does not require 
the creation of a new bureaucracy or the funding of its investigations. 
Some scholars instead argue that improving creditor rights and regulation of the banking system 
should take priority. In this view, equity markets in developing countries are just a sideshow, because 
most financing occurs through banks.60 While it is true that equity markets as yet play a small role in 
most developing countries and that an efficient commercial banking system is very desirable, this does 
not diminish the value of effective equity market reforms.  
Developing-country equity markets are small and often insignificant precisely because they are 
poorly regulated. If small savers cannot trust that they will get a fair return from equity investments, they 
will instead deposit their money with a bank or other financial intermediary. Both the theoretical and 
empirical literature suggest that different types of business will be better served with different kinds of 
financing.61 If only bank loans are available, some kinds of businesses may have difficulty getting started 
or growing. Furthermore, if well-run banks have access to cheaper equity financing, they should be able 
to expand their size and scope to serve more domestic clients. 
As countries continue to open their equity markets to foreign investors and improve the protection 
of minority shareholders, there is good reason to believe that equity markets will continue to grow in 
importance relative to debt. In addition to providing additional capital to fund growth opportunities, less 
reliance on debt financing in the future might also lessen the frequency and severity of emerging-market 
                                                 
60. Berglof and von Thadden (1999); Mishkin (2000).  
 
 financial crises. 
 
____________________ 
61. Carlin and Mayer (2003). 
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Table 7-1 Composition of Capital Inflows to Developing Countries, 1970–95 
 Average 1970–74 Average 1975–79 Average 1980–84 Average 1985–89 Average 1990–95 
Category of  
capital inflow 
Millions of 
dollars 
Percentage 
of total 
Millions of 
dollars 
Percentage 
of total 
Millions of 
dollars 
Percentage 
of total 
Millions of 
dollars 
Percentage 
of total 
Millions of 
dollars 
Percentage 
of total 
Net resource flows 12,529.1 100.0 32,836.8 100.0 51,604.7 100.0 32,726.2 100.0 90,184.1 100.0 
aNet flows on debt   10,121.3 80.8 27,151.3 82.7 42,374.6 82.1 20,563.4 62.8 45,316.2 50.2 
Public and publicly 
guaranteed debt  5,628.0 44.9 18,014.0 54.9 28,383.4 55.0 14,844.5 45.4 12,820.5 14.2 
Private 
nonguaranteed debt  4,493.4 35.9 9,137.3 27.8 13,991.2 27.1 5,718.9 17.5 32,495.8 36.0 
Foreign direct 
investment 1,798.6 14.4 4,247.2 12.9 6,871.7 13.3 9,006.5 27.5 24,993.8 27.7 
Portfolio equity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.0 0.1 762.2 2.3 16,855.0 18.7 
Grants 609.2 4.9 1,438.3 4.4 2,331.3 4.5 2,394.2 7.3 3,019.0 3.3 
a. Public and publicly guaranteed debt plus private nonguaranteed debt.
 
  
Table 7-2. Dates of Stock Market Liberalization, by Country  
Country  
Year of 
liberalization 
Means of 
liberalization 
Argentina 1989 Policy decree 
Brazil 1988 Country fund 
Chile 1987 Country fund 
Colombia 1991 Policy decree 
India 1986 Country fund 
Indonesia 1989 Policy decree 
Jordan 1995 Policy decree 
Korea, Rep. of 1987 Country fund 
Malaysia 1987 Country fund 
Mexico 1989 Policy decree 
Nigeria 1995 Policy decree 
Pakistan 1991 Policy decree 
Philippines 1986 Country fund 
Taiwan 1986 Country fund 
Thailand 1987 Country fund 
Turkey 1989 Policy decree 
Venezuela 1990 Policy decree 
Zimbabwe 1993 Policy decree 
 
  
Table 7-3. Investor Protection, by Country  
Rule  
of law 
Judicial 
efficiency 
Contract 
repudiation
Expropriation 
risk 
Accounting 
standards Country 
Argentina 5.4 6.0 4.9 5.9 4.5 
Brazil 6.3 5.8 6.3 7.6 5.4 
Chile 7.0 7.3 6.8 7.5 5.2 
Colombia 2.1 7.3 7.0 7.0 5.0 
Ecuador 6.7 6.3 5.2 6.6 NA 
Egypt 4.2 6.5 6.1 6.3 2.4 
Greece 6.2 7.0 6.6 7.1 5.5 
India 4.2 8.0 6.1 7.8 5.7 
Indonesia 4.0 2.5 6.1 7.2 NA 
Jordan 4.4 8.7 4.9 6.1 NA 
Kenya 5.4 5.8 5.7 6.0 NA 
Korea, Rep. of 5.4 6.0 8.6 8.3 6.2 
Malaysia 6.8 9.0 7.4 8.0 7.6 
Mexico 5.4 6.0 6.6 7.3 6.0 
Nigeria 2.7 7.3 4.4 5.3 5.9 
Pakistan 3.0 5.0 4.9 5.6 NA 
Peru 2.5 6.8 4.7 5.5 3.8 
Philippines 2.7 4.8 4.8 5.2 6.5 
South Africa 4.4 6.0 7.3 6.9 7.0 
Sri Lanka 1.9 7.0 5.3 6.1 NA 
Thailand 6.3 3.3 7.6 7.4 6.4 
Turkey 5.2 4.0 6.0 7.0 5.1 
Uruguay 5.0 6.5 7.3 6.6 3.1 
Venezuela 6.4 6.5 6.3 6.9 4.0 
Zimbabwe 3.7 7.5 5.0 5.6 NA 
      
Mean      
Less-developed countries  4.7 6.3 6.1 6.7 3.8 
Developed countries 9.1 9.1 9.2 9.5 6.4 
Source: López-de-Silanes (2002). 
 
 Figure 1.  The Cost of Capital Capital Falls When Countries Liberalize the Capital Account.
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 Figure 2. Investment Booms When Countries Liberalize the Capital Account .
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 Figure 3.  The Growth Rate of Output Per Worker Increases When Countries Liberalize
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 Figure 4. Growth Also Increases Following Trade Liberalizations
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Figure 5. Growth Also Increases Following Inflation Stabilization Programs
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